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Abstract 
The greatest threat in the new generation network which is called 
NGN is unsafe authentication. Communication between new 
servers in NGN world is done based on Session Initiation 
Protocol (SIP). SIP is an application-layer control operating on 
top of a transport protocol which allows creating, modifying, and 
terminating sessions among more agents. For authentication, SIP 
relies on HTTP Digest by default; the client is authenticated to 
the SIP proxy server, called one way authentication, because in 
this approach we can authenticate client to server and the client 
can’t do any authentication in server side. In this paper we 
propose a mutual authentication mechanism that is not based on 
HTTP Digest and then, we implement our method in IMS and 
start to do authentication client to server is done in first step and 
server to client next. By this solution, we found that our 
proposed mechanism has more stability against intruder and 
unauthorized access to system. In this paper, we introduce a new 
approach for user authentication or server authentication by 
using OPTIONAL SIP’s header. In our solution we can increase 
necessary steps for intruder to decode authentication, 
compilation time and encoding time and save our system from 
some attack such as offline attack and replay 
Keywords: IMS network; SIPSecurit,HTTP Digest . 
1. Introduction 
The primary generation of networks services was based on 
client server architectures. The modern networks like IMS, 
considers the new need for security and implement some 
mutual authentication mechanisms: for example 
Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) [1] and TLS 
and IPSec [2] are respectively deployed for mobile 
networks to mutually authenticate the entities using 
challenge-response mechanisms. In this paper, we provide 
a new approach to increase authentication security 
between client and SIP servers. SIP is a real time signaling 
protocol used in IMS networks. Usually, SIP is used in 
many applications such as chat, voice over IP (VOIP), any 
real time services, etc. 
SIP uses a set of request messages including INVITE, 
ACK, CANCEL, OPTIONS, BYE and REGISTER. A 
User Agent, wishing to initiate a session, sends an 
INVITE message. SIP uses OK message after ACK 
message and uses BYE to terminate session. More 
explanation can be found in the RFC3261 document [3]. 
Some solutions have been developed to improve SIP 
security, but most of protocols or implementations create 
interoperability  problems. Attackers can easily download 
free software to sniff packets and analyzes networks [4]. 
IP telephony infrastructure could be attacked by using a 
large collection of hack techniques [5].Since the 
authentication based on HTTP Digest mechanism is one of 
SIP weakness, this paper proposes a new approach to 
improve authentication in SIP security base on IMS 
network. 
 
2. SIP authentication mechanism 
 
Using SIP, there exist three basic principles for providing 
security, Tasi, Yang and Durlanik [6]. These three security 
solutions on SIP data involves http digest. In terms of 
authentication in SIP, several mechanisms exist which we 
introduce as follows. SIP specification [8] introduces 
HTTP digest authentication and usage of S/MIME 
extensions. In addition to those, we introduce also other 
techniques of authentication, which are designed to 
improve security in SIP. HTTP Digest provides a 
challenge/response message and is used by default MD5 
algorithm [9]. As another aspect, some lightweight 
programs such as lightweight scheme defined by Kong et 
al have several problems. For example, this mechanism 
uses SIP user client phones in signing contact addresses 
instead of the registrar servers. The actual amount of 
throughput is not given in [6]. 
SIP uses a header called ‘nonce’ to build a ‘response’ in 
the general protocol that use at now. The nonce is a 
random variable which is generated by server proxy and is 
created using username, method and password for 
response to operate. The response produced by this 
formula is shown in algorithm(1) as shown in fig. 1. 
 
 H(A1)=MD5(username: realm: password) 
 H(A2)=MD5(METHOD: Request-URI) 
 response=MD5(H(A1): nonce: H(A2)) 
Figure 1:Algorithm1: a creating response 
3. Problems in SIP authentication 
 
We have two major weaknesses in HTTP digest 
authentication in SIP [4]. The first missing security issue 
is the lack of securing all headers and parameters in SIP 
which would possibly need protection. The second 
  
security weakness, relating to digest authentication, is the 
requirement of pre-existing user configuration on servers, 
which does not scale well [9].Though, for authenticating 
in cellular mobile communication, it provides simple 
authentication. With the Universal Mobile 
Telecommunications System, there is an improvement 
with the AKA mechanism [9]. This solution enables a 
mutual authentication between any devices and the 
network. This security policy requires a shared secret key 
and a shared cryptographic algorithm that exist in SIP. So, 
pre-share keys are one of the main problems for security 
distributed keys and cause algorithm load for encode and 
decode security information packet. S/MIME in SIP is 
used on carrying signed or encrypted replication of 
headers and authenticating users. This mechanism lacks 
the public key distribution problem, which means that the 
public keys used in authentication are difficult to distribute 
and maintain. The public key infrastructure is also 
susceptible to man-in-the middle attack [10,11]. It uses 
several hash computations and server certificates to ensure 
security. This causes overhead and reduction in 
performance. So, we tried to solve these problems without 
any protocol changes. Also, if the load increases, the 
server comes more vulnerable to denial of service attacks 
as stated in [12, 13].  
 
4. OUR SOLUTION OVERVIEW 
 
First, when invite message is received in server, the server 
start to generate nonce and qop and give a copy of these 
two parameters and then these two values are encrypted by 
MD5. Then, it sends these 2 parameters by its IP and “nc” 
to client side which we use this massage in challenge 
massage. In the client side, decoding this packet and 
saving “qop”, ”nonce” and server’s IP and changing client 
“nc” to one. After received “qop”, the client start to 
generate “cnonce” and make copy and save of it for 
compare in next step. Cnonce a new sip parameter that 
introduced in RFC 2617 this parameter is random value 
generated after receive qop in server challenge message 
after generated cnonce by client. we show this algorithm 
in Fig 2. 
Authenticate: Digest 
realm=“biloxi.com”, 
qop=”auth,auth-int”, 
Server ip=”X.X.X.X”, 
nonce=”dcd98b7102dd2f0e8b11d0f600bfb0”, 
nc= for first try is one 
algorithm=MD5 
Figure 2:Algorithm1: generating nonce and qop and nc in server 
proxy 
Second, after the execution of the first part, the random 
value generated is called cnonce. Then, we apply SIP 
messages and encrypt them by MD5 algorithm. The other 
side in the server proxy uses the algorithm (3) to save 
cnonce and compare (qop, nc, nonce) which is shown in 
Fig. 3 . The Cnonce is calculated in the client by this 
algorithm (3). 
 
Authorization: Digest username=””, 
 Realm=”biloxi.com”, 
 nonce=”dcd98b7102dd2f0e8b11d0f600bfb0”, 
 qop=auth, 
 nc=00000001, 
 IP=”X.X.X.X”, 
 cnonce=”0a4f113b”, 
 response=”6629faea05397450978507c4ef1”, 
Figure 3: Algorithm2: Cnonce genareate in client and send to server 
Finally, when message is received in the proxy server, the 
proxy starts to decode the message and compare the qop 
and nonce messages to save qop, nonce and, nc. The 
related algorithm is shown in Fig. 3 and the flowchart is 
demonstrated in Fig. 4. If these three parameters are the 
same, then the user is authenticated for the server and 
server sends Cnonce, qop, nonce and nc adds on 200 ok 
massage. However, if one of these items is missing and it 
is found through comparing, the client will not be 
authenticated and the session will be terminated. These 
two algorithms are necessary for mutual authentication 
since we should use three parameters that are useful for 
mutual authentication. At the client side, when the 200 ok 
message is received, the add-on parameters start to 
compare the nonce, cnonce, qop and nc parameters. If all 
parameters are same as the previous message, the server is 
authenticated to the client. This model is suitable for 
service providers and users because at the service side, 
providers do not need to change any protocols in 
subsystem and, its extra lightweight character is suitable 
for weaker client’s devices. By applying this approach we 
will be able to access the selective mutual authentication. 
The selective mutual authentication invitation massage is 
shown in algorithm (4). In other words; the algorithm (4) 
is our only   suggestion in case of selective algorithm in 
user’s device. This selective announce will be the first sent   
message to the server after the invite message. 
Nevertheless, if the client chooses the selective algorithm 
in his mutual authentication, he will send a second 
message to the server Another approach can also be 
implemented in which client can selectively authenticate 
server. If it is not necessary to authenticate, by sending the 
following algorithm it does not authenticate server. In 
proposed algorithm, if client does not send value of 
  
cnonce, server just send message 200 ok and decrease 
client overhead.  
Client sends authentication to server, algorithm of request-
digest when cnonce is not presented and client does not 
want to authenticate server and the MD5 algorithm is 
used, it is shown in below.  
This concept means that the client sends the algorithm (4) 
to server when authenticating the server to the client is not 
necessary, he sends the algorithm (2) when it is necessary 
to authenticate server. We tested this idea in mutual 
authentication by AVSPA tools. 
 
 
request-digest = <”>< KD ( H(A1), unq(nonce-value) 
  “:” nc-value 
    “:”unq(qop-value) 
  “:” H(A2) 
      ) ><”> 
A1 = unq(username-value) “:” unq(realm-value) “:” 
passwd 
A2 = Method “:” digest-uri-value 
Figure : Algorithm4: not Cnonce genareateand client does not need to 
server authentication 
Our simulations are done using AVSPA tools. We 
compared our results with Yang, Durlanik, Tasi. We also 
found actual amount of throughput and compared it by 
Tasi,Yang, Durlanik and two other solution [16,10]. Our 
results are shown in the Table1.  
For more clarification we test our approach in real HTTP 
Digest that worked in traditional and we found several 
results which are shown in table below. Their approach 
increased the processing overhead of SIP messages by 20 
ms in trade. The initial overhead was 50 which rose to 70 
ms with their method. Considering analysis, their 
approach caused the stages to reach 5 which were 4. As 
another aspect of our method, we can reduce our 
processing time. We compare this method with Yang, 
Durlanik, Tasi. We increase steps of intruder for accesses 
to session line from 26 to 32 steeps using this solution.  
The comparison is summarized in Table 1 
Table 1: Margin specifications 
Parameter Traditional 
Digest 
New 
approach 
Yang Durlanik Tasi 
Intruder 26 step 32 step 30step 31step 30step 
Compilation 0.07ms 0.02ms 0.03ms 0.06ms 0.04ms 
Encoder 0.02 ms 0.01ms 0.04ms 0.04 0.03 
Analyze 5 stag 4 stage 4 5 4 
Overhead 70ms 50ms 80ms 85ms 80ms 
Throughput 30ms 20ms 20ms 30ms 20ms 
 
This solution performs approximately near to using SIP 
networks. We have tested encoding time, processing time, 
intruder steeps and throughput of a SIP server for 
authentication in call setup phase. We also evaluate the 
results by the amount of INVITE requests served per 
minute. The considerable reduction in processing and 
encoding time without reducing network security is 
novelty of our method in NGN network. This method has 
very lightweight scheme and it is suitable for mutual 
authentication in SIP. It is not dependent on structure. This 
method can effectively solve problems about offline 
attacks. 
In our solution we can solve problems regarding 
distributed keys by our method by generating new string 
of new value. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This solution performs approximately near to using SIP 
networks. We have tested encoding time, processing time, 
intruder steeps and throughput of a SIP server for 
authentication in call setup phase. We also evaluate the 
results by the amount of INVITE requests served per 
minute. The considerable reduction in processing and 
encoding time without reducing network security is 
novelty of our method in NGN network. This method has 
very lightweight scheme and it is suitable for mutual 
authentication in SIP. It is not dependent on structure. This 
method can effectively solve problems about offline 
attacks. 
In our solution we can solve problems regarding 
distributed keys by our method by generating new 
Acknowledgments 
Authors want to thank from he Iranian Telecommunication 
Researcch center for ICT – ITRC for supporting this research 
work at IMS innovation Lab at ITRC-Iran-Tehran. 
 
 
 
 
References 
[1] J. Rosenberg, H. Schulzrinne, G. Camarillo, A. Johnston, J. Peterson, 
R. Sparks, M. Handley and E. Schooler,“SIP: Session Initiation 
Protocol”, RFC 3261, June 2002: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3261.txt.. 
 
[2] B. Wallis, “Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Digest 
Authentication using Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) 
A3 and A8”, Internet draft (work in progress), August 2007. 
 
[3] Liao YP, Wang SS. “A new secure password authenticated key 
agreement scheme for SIP using self-certified public keys on elliptic 
curves”. Computer and Communications 2010; 33(3):372–380. 
 
  
[4] P. Urien, “TLS Tripartite Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange”, IETF draft 
(work in progress), July 2010. 
 
[5] RFC 4492, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for 
Transport Layer Security (TLS)", May 2006. 
 
 [6] T. Russell, The IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) Session Control & 
Other Network Operations, published by Mc Graw Hill,2008. 
[7] W. Werapun, A. A. El Kalam, B. Paillassa, J. Fasson,'' Solution 
Analysis for SIP Security Threats'', The IEEE international Conference 
on Innovations In Inforamtion Technology(IIT'08), 2008. 
 
[8] B. Li,D. Wang, S. Zhang, '' Policy Based SIP Signaling Management 
in IMS'', Alcatel-Lucent 1-6/F Sec. D Hi-Tech Software Park Qingdao, 
266101, China 
 
[9] A. Nemi, J. Arkko, V. Torvinen, '' Hypertext Transfer 
Protocol(HTTP) Digest Authentication Using Authentication and Key 
Agrement(AKA),IETF RFC 3310, 2002. 
 
[10] T. Dierks, E. Rescorla, The Transport |Layer Security(TLS) Protocol 
Version 1.2, 2008 
 
[11] M. Sher, T. Magedanz, ''Developing Network Domain Security 
(NDS) Model for IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS)'' ,IEEE First 
International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security 
(ARES'06), Austria, 2006 
 
[12] F. Leitold, A. Medve, L. Kovacs, " SIP security problems in NGM 
Services ",  The IEEE International Conference on Next Generation 
Mobile Applications, Services and Technologies (NGMAST'07),2007. 
 
[13] www.avspa.com 
[14] Jo H, Lee Y, Kim M, Kim S, Won D. “Off-line password-guessing 
attack to Yang’s and Huang’s authentication schemes for session 
initiation protocol”. Fifth International Joint Conference on INC, IMS 
and IDC, 2009; 618–621. 
 
[15] . Tsai JL. “Efficient nonce-based authentication scheme for session 
initiation protocol”. International Journal of Network Security 2009; 
8(3):312–316. 
 
[16] . Yoon E, Shin Y, Jeon I, Yoo K. “Robust mutual authentication 
with a key agreement scheme for the session initiation protocol”. IETE 
Technical Review 2010; 27(3):203–213. 
 
[17] Kong L., Balasubramaniyan V.B. and Ahamad M. A lightweight 
scheme for securely and reliably locating SIP users. VoIP Management 
and Security, IEEE Workshop, Apr 2006. Page(s): 9-17. 
. 
 
 
First Author 2010-2012: M.Sc. student in Computer 
Architecture, Computer Engineering Department, Iran University 
of Science and Technology, Tehran, Iran. GPA: 
2007-2009: B.Sc. In Information Communication Technology , 
Electrical  Engineering Department, Kermanshah. University Of 
Applied Science And Technology. IRAN, Tehran. GPA: 
. 
 
Second Author Ph.D.    Informatics, University of Rennes I, 
FRANCE, July 1998. M.Sc.    Telematics & Information 
Systems, SUPELEC, Rennes, FRANCE, June 1994 
B.Sc.    Electrical Engineering (Computer 
Hardware), Sharif University ofTechnology,           Tehran, 
IRAN, Sept,1990 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
